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Psychoanalysis proffers a wealth of phenomenological tools to advance the study of
consciousness. Techniques for elucidating the structures of subjective life are sorely
lacking in the cognitive sciences; as such, experiential reporting techniques must rise to
meet both complex theories of brain function and increasingly sophisticated neuroimaging
technologies. Analysis may offer valuable methods for bridging the gap between ﬁrst-
person and third-person accounts of the mind. Using both systematic observational
approaches alongside unstructured narrative interactions, psychoanalysts help patients
articulate their experience and bring unconscious mental contents into awareness. Similar
to seasoned meditators or phenomenologists, individuals who have undergone analysis
are experts in discerning and describing their subjective experience, thus making them
ideal candidates for neurophenomenology. Moreover, analytic techniques may provide a
means of guiding untrained experimental participants to greater awareness of their mental
continuum, as well as gathering subjective reports about fundamental yet elusive aspects
of experience including selfhood, temporality, and inter-subjectivity. Mining psychoanalysis
for its methodological innovations provides a fresh turn for the neuropsychoanalysis
movement and cognitive science as a whole – showcasing the integrity of analysis
alongside the irreducibility of human experience.
Keywords: phenomenology of consciousness, phenomenology, first-person perspective, subjective experience,
neuroscience methods
INTRODUCTION
This paper illustrates how the marriage of phenomenology and
psychoanalysis can inform the scientiﬁc study of conscious-
ness. In particular, we outline the potential psychoanalysis
holds as a tool for fostering different states of awareness and
gathering experiential accounts for the purposes of cognitive
neuroscience. Methods for elucidating the structures of phenom-
enal experience are scantily present in the landscape composing
the cognitive sciences. This lacuna – a palpable gap between
subjective and objective techniques – calls for expert meth-
ods to discern and describe experience from ﬁrst and second
person perspectives. While readily embracing psychodynamic
theory, proponents of the neuropsychoanalysis movement have
largely overlooked the methods inherent to analysis. A cen-
tral aspect of the psychoanalytic approach, the unstructured
narrative interaction forms the backbone of analysis. Though
unconventional in the context of experimental neuropsychology,
to disparage the narrative dynamic would cripple the research
potential of psychoanalysis (Bazan, 2011). For example, cog-
nitive scientists stand to beneﬁt from narrative approaches to
guide participants to uncover unconscious aspects of their expe-
rience, cultivate meta-awareness, and elicit descriptive ﬁrsthand
reports. Here we argue that viewing psychoanalysis as a method
for elucidating subjective experience best motivates collabora-
tion between neuroscience and psychoanalysis. Sketching the crux
of contemporary neuropsychoanalysis, we highlight the relative
merits of a crosstalk with the critical neuroscience movement
of neurophenomenology. We conclude by discussing how the
development of new phenomenological techniques may leverage
psychoanalytic methods in the clinical and experimental study of
consciousness.
NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS IN FLUX
Neuroscientists, as well as psychoanalysts, are still trying to deter-
mine the nature of their collaboration in the burgeoning ﬁeld
of neuropsychoanalysis. Controversy regarding the relationship
between psychoanalysis and the natural sciences dates back to
Freud’s time, and continues to garner much attention today
(Cohler and Galatzer-Levy, 2007). While some scholars consider
neurobiology and psychoanalysis to be epistemologically and ter-
minologically irreconcilable (Borch-Jacobsen and Shamdasani,
2011), the organic basis of mental life is one of the founding
tenets of psychoanalysis (e.g., Freud, 1910b, p. 209). Freud (1895)
had anticipated a future in which the psychological and neural
sciences would coalesce. Since the 1990s, this vision has gradually
come to fruition: while neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists
have rekindled their interest in psychoanalytic ideas, analysts have
increasingly turned toward the biological sciences (Fotopoulou
et al., 2012). Overarching arguments continue to suggest that neu-
ropsychoanalysis binds neuroscience and analysis by facilitating a
crosstalk on topics of mutual interest (Solms and Turnbull, 2011).
These global accounts inspire leading contemporary scholars to
follow this intuitive lead and expound on the details of this
cooperation.
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Most research under the label of “neuropsychoanalysis” seeks
to situate the concepts of psychoanalysis within the framework
of contemporary neuroscience. Early collaboration, in the spirit
of Freud, centered on understanding neuropathology from a psy-
chodynamic perspective (Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000). This
manner of clinically oriented investigation has since expanded
to include studies of pathological behavior (e.g., depression and
anxiety, Zellner et al., 2011), the neural mechanisms of psycho-
dynamic psychotherapy (Gerber, 2011), as well as attempts to
ﬁnd biologicalmeasures for therapeutic outcomes (Shedler, 2010).
Other research in neuropsychoanalysis ﬁts with the preclinical
cognitive neuroscience of consciousness. These investigations aim
to develop models of the brain that accommodate and illumi-
nate psychoanalytic phenomena such as repression (Bazan and
Snodgrass, 2012), libido (Pfaff and Fisher, 2012), the dynamic
unconscious (Shevrin et al., 1996; Berlin, 2011; Solms and Zellner,
2012), and dreaming (Zellner, 2013). As the investigatory domain
of contemporary neuropsychoanalysis grows, so does the variety
of empirical approaches: from neuroimaging techniques to exper-
imental behavioralmethods and animal studies (Fotopoulou et al.,
2012).
Some analysts view neuropsychoanalysis as a weight on psy-
choanalytic discourse. Such clinicians see the movement as
perpetuating the view that psychoanalysis needs biological bol-
stering to be complete, legitimate, and relevant (Blass and
Carmeli, 2007). Other scholars have been especially critical of
neuropsychoanalysis, suggesting that it could taint quality, and
understanding of analysis among clinicians (Hoffman, 2009).
These claims likely emerge in response to studies that purport
to investigate the “scientiﬁc validity” of psychoanalytic theo-
ries (cf dream theory in Shirley, 2011). Alas, such scientism
runs counter to the very epistemology set forth by the founders
of neuropsychoanalysis, who encourage a balance between sci-
entiﬁc objectivity and the subjective insights of psychoanalysis
(Fotopoulou et al., 2012). Other critics argue that neuroscience is
irrelevant to clinical practice, as the latter emphasizes uniquely
personal accounts that are scantily amenable to scientiﬁc gen-
eralization (Pulver, 2003; Mechelli, 2010). Proponents of neu-
ropsychoanalysis typically respond that while the entire spectrum
of neuroscientiﬁc studies may be less clinically relevant to psy-
choanalysts, some studies undoubtedly are, for example animal
studies that shed light on primal emotional behavior (Panksepp
and Solms, 2012). And while concerns about the integrity of clin-
ical practice remain an important issue, analysts also warn against
an insular psychoanalysis that fails to engage in a constructive
and critical dialog with the larger scientiﬁc community (Safran,
2012).
The collaboration between neuroscience and psychoanalysis
reﬂects greater questions about the nature of scientiﬁc research,
discourse, and validation (Aron, 2012). By incorporating phe-
nomenological domains into traditional experimental paradigms,
neuropsychoanalysis are reshaping the boundaries of science.
Findings from neuroscience, moreover, increasingly govern our
popular conceptions concerning behavior, psychopathology, and
what it means to be human (Thornton, 2011; Young, 2011).
Neuropsychoanalysis, therefore, joins the critical neuroscience
movement in engaging the scientiﬁc community with discussions
about culture, meaning, and the irreducibility of human experi-
ence (Choudhury and Slaby, 2011).Within this overarching search
to unravel the relationship between the mind and body, a central
question looms: can the objective third-person methods of cogni-
tive science account for the ﬁrst-person experience of subjective
mental life?
NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
The question of how and why humans are conscious –
known amongst philosophers as the “hard problem” of
consciousness – has provokedmajor debate concerning the nature
of scientiﬁc inquiry. Most scientists posit that biological mech-
anisms subserve conscious experience, albeit little knowledge
informs the details of such mechanisms (Chalmers, 1995, 2002).
Neurologists have long recognized that we seem able to account
for the workings of the human brain without recourse to
inﬂuences beyond the laws of physical science (Eccles, 1965).
Subsequently, many thinkers feel hard-pressed to speculate on
the evolutionary and functional role of consciousness (Harnad,
2002). Such questions have led some philosophers to the con-
clusion that consciousness is an illusory heuristic (Churchland,
1981). These thinkers argue that conscious experience just is
the neurobiological correlate of consciousness – a position that
most neuroscientists hold as their “spontaneous philosophy”
(Varela, 1998, p. 31; Dennett, 2001). Others disagree and argue
that a description of mind that refers only to biological sub-
strates and processes necessarily leaves something out. These
scholars insist that consciousness is irreducible to information
processing in the brain (Velmans, 2009) and emphasize that
our conscious experience presupposes “every statement, model,
or theory” of natural science (Thompson, 2004, p. 394). Such
philosophical discord persists, reﬂecting and motivating practi-
cal challenges in the study of consciousness at the experimental
level.
One response to the puzzle of consciousness comes from neu-
rophenomenology, a movement founded by Varela et al. (1992).
According to Varela, the hard problem is established on a deeply
ingrained, falsely dualistic understanding of mind and brain.
Instead of trying to philosophically “solve” the hard problem, he
proposed that cognitive scientists take a methodological approach
(Varela, 1996). In order to elucidate how and why experiences
arise from neural processes, scientists require careful descrip-
tions of experience to match the reﬁned objective descriptions
of brain functioning (Jack and Shallice, 2001; Lutz, 2002); how-
ever, researchers have largely eschewed such ﬁrst-personmethods.
This trend partly owes to the recent focus in cognitive science
on imaging of the living human brain alongside a long-standing
ambivalence towards introspective reports (Nisbett and Wil-
son, 1977). Thus, while researchers are now equipped with
many advanced methods for imaging and modeling the brain in
ﬁne-grained detail, sophisticated methods for describing and dis-
criminating subjective experience continue to lag behind. Varela
advocated bridging this methodological gap by incorporating
the experiential techniques of phenomenology into a circulating
dialog with the third-person methods of cognitive science. His
neurophenomenology seeks to give an “explicit and central role
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to ﬁrst-person accounts and to the irreducible nature of experi-
ence, while at the same time refusing both a dualistic concession
or a pessimistic surrender” (Varela, 1998, p. 32). In doing so, neu-
rophenomenology does not solve, but rather “dis-solves” the hard
problem (Varela, 1998).
Proponents of Varela have realized the neurophenomenologi-
cal project in different forms and under a variety of labels. Some
scholars focus on the philosophical details of the collaboration
between phenomenology and cognitive science (Gallagher, 2003).
These theorists tease apart difﬁcult phenomenological issues, such
as the nature of indexing the self (Zahavi and Roepstorff, 2011),
and conducting investigations into experiential realms pertinent
to clinicians, including the phenomenology of psychopathology,
(e.g., Sass et al., 2011). Neurophenomenology is also a growing
scientiﬁc research program that seeks to modify and complement
traditional methods of neuroscience for better phenomenological
inquiry. For example, cognitive scientists have adapted a neu-
roimaging paradigm to allow for periodic “experience sampling”
of subjects during experiments (Christoff et al., 2009). Some inves-
tigators utilize experimental participants who are already expert at
observing and describing their experience, such as Buddhist med-
itators (Farb et al., 2007; Lutz et al., 2008). Other scholars have
proposed that researchersmay harness hypnotic and posthypnotic
suggestion to alter subjective experience and encourage particu-
lar states of awareness (Lifshitz et al., 2013, 2014). One group of
researchers in neurophenomenology focuses on developing ﬁrst-
person methods (Depraz et al., 2003; Vermersch, 2009) as well
as second-person interviewing techniques for aiding subjects in
attending to and articulating their experience (e.g., Petitmen-
gin, 2006). Across all approaches, both theoretical and applied
neurophenomenologists aim to bind ﬁrst-person approaches with
the techniques of modern cognitive science to uncover the basic
structures of consciousness (Gallagher and Schmicking, 2010).
Psychoanalysis seems apposite to the goals of neurophe-
nomenology; yet neurophenomenologists have largely overlooked
psychoanalytic techniques and theories. Instead, neurophenome-
nologists have turned to two main sources of inspiration:Western
Phenomenology (e.g., following philosophers such as Heidegger,
Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty; see Schmicking, 2010) and Eastern
contemplative traditions including Buddhist practices (Thomp-
son, 2006; Schmicking, 2010). Research in neurophenomenology
centers on training or guiding participants to discern and describe
their experiencewith awareness and impartiality (Petitmengin and
Bitbol, 2011). The neurophenomenology approach encourages
individuals to reﬂexively observe consciousness from their ﬁrst-
person perspective and to recount accurate and detailed subjective
reports (Lutz and Thompson, 2003). Although the inclusion of
psychoanalysis in the neurophenomenological toolbox has yet to
occur, Western Phenomenology, and psychoanalytic theory do
overlap (Karlsson, 2010; Csordas, 2012). Indeed, the existential
psychiatry movement of the early 20th century bridged the two
disciplines in letter as well as in spirit (Halling and Dearborn Nill,
1995). Moreover, current efforts in neurophenomenology such as
the “explicitation interview” harken to psychoanalytic techniques.
The explicitation interview is a practice of “guided retrospective
introspection” that incorporates inter-subjective guidance and
non-leading suggestions to promote awareness of processes that
typically remain implicit and un-seen within the ﬁeld of experi-
ence, also known as “meta-awareness” (Maurel, 2009; Vermersch,
2009). Similarly, analysts describe the therapeutic process as
“making the unconscious conscious” and commonly gage the
completion of analysis by when the patient can freely articu-
late whatever comes to mind (Freud, 1910a; Wachtel, 2012).
Thus, psychodynamic methods already suffuse established neu-
rophenomenological protocols for cultivating meta-awareness in
untrained participants.
The motives and objectives of neurophenomenology resonate
with the call to neuropsychoanalysis. Both movements point
to the need for a psychological theory in neuroscience that
avoids fracturing or reducing human experience into a collec-
tion of functions and abilities. Just as neurophenomenologists
emphasize the “embodied mind” (Clark, 1999; Thompson and
Varela, 2001), neuropsychoanalysts urge scholars to reimag-
ine the “minded brain” (Panksepp and Solms, 2012). Both
groups argue that without a theoretical framework that oper-
ates at the level of the subject, neuropsychology fails to capture
the psychological at all (Bazan, 2011), as well as stress the
need for a “neurophenomenal level of analysis” in experimental
neuropsychology (Panksepp and Solms, 2012). Like its phe-
nomenological counterpart, neuropsychoanalysis can be seen
as a direct effort against the implicit biological reductionism
in cognitive neuroscience. Current research in the neuropsy-
choanalysis community appears biased toward the traditional
methods of cognitive neuroscience. To analysts, collaboration
with cognitive neuroscience runs the risk of reducing psycho-
analytic “meaning” to neural “cause.” In line with the outlook
Varela espoused, a turn toward the methodological in neu-
ropsychoanalysis could help assuage these concerns, shifting
the emphasis from psychoanalytic theory (e.g., testing the sci-
entiﬁc validity of psychoanalytic concepts) to psychoanalytic
methods (e.g., incorporating technical aspects of the therapeu-
tic process into experimental protocols). However, while both
neurophenomenology and neuropsychoanalysis call for a theory
of experience at the subject level, only the former has gen-
erated an empirical program for incorporating that theory in
practice. In closing, therefore, we propose that neuropsycho-
analysis may present a new incarnation of neurophenomenol-
ogy.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The practical realization of neuropsychoanalysis-as-neuropheno-
menology presents many challenges. For example, is it possi-
ble to harness elements of the intuitive therapeutic process in
an experimental context? Whereas Varela called upon Western
phenomenology and Eastern contemplative traditions for their
systematic treatment of ﬁrsthand experience, analysts often cite
one of the hallmarks of psychoanalysis as the “imprecise” treat-
ment of ﬁrsthand experience (Bazan, 2011, p. 2).Written accounts
of therapeutic methods (e.g., the speciﬁc strategies that an analyst
employs to bring out the unconscious stories of their patients)
tend to take the form of case studies. Descriptions of more uni-
versal or underlying therapeutic techniques are sparse; analysts
train in vivo, by engaging in clinical internships and undergo-
ing analysis themselves. While philosophers and analysts have
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considered the mechanism of psychoanalytic insight and the
relation betweenpsychoanalytic insight and the structures of expe-
rience as described by cognitive and phenomenological science,
these topics remain largely pristine on the proverbial “To Do” list
of neuropsychoanalysis research (Strachey, 1934; Karlsson, 2010).
And yet, phenomenology and psychoanalysis both draw on the
premise that the vague nature of experience hardly precludes its
careful articulation, analysis, and interpretation. A dialog between
neuropsychoanalysis and neurophenomenology, therefore, would
engender more precise ideas concerning the speciﬁc psychoana-
lytic techniques that can inform a correlation between ﬁrsthand
descriptions of experience and third-person data.
One approach would advocate for including individuals who
have undergone analysis as neurophenomenology participants.
In the same way we treat seasoned meditators or phenomenol-
ogists, we can exploit the process of discerning and describing
the psychoanalytic experience. This idea is scarcely new among
analysts: “(One) might manipulate different neuropeptides, in
research participants who are themselves psychoanalysts, and then
have them describe their subjective states, using their expertise in
doing so (with reference to the theoretical concepts that we use).
Approaches such as this are rather radical, but they have huge
potential, and appear to be remarkably underappreciated” (Solms
and Turnbull, 2011, p. 9). To consider analysts and analysands
experiential experts on par with, say, trained meditators raises
many a problem. And yet, experiments involving either psycho-
analytically trained individuals or Buddhist monks would both
necessarily involve a second-person component – such as the
explicitation interview – thereby exploiting a similar experimental
approach.
Spanning an array of literature from clinical science and con-
sciousness research, here we show how neurophenomenology
casts a fresh light on the neuropsychoanalysis movement. While
proponents of neuropsychoanalysis emphasize the importance of
bringing a subject-oriented approach to cognitive neuroscience,
these scholars have largely neglected the task of incorporating
psychodynamic methods in an experimental setting. Cognitive
scientists, however, stand to beneﬁt from drawing on psychoana-
lytic techniques. Given their expertise in calling the unconscious
mind to awareness, analysts could help researchers promote meta-
awareness and gather subjective reports that effectively describe
the structures of experience. At the same time, focusing on the
possibilities of methodological exchange between neuroscience
and psychoanalysis offers an answer to concerns within the neu-
ropsychoanalysis community. Rather than foisting neuroscientiﬁc
methods and models onto the theories of psychoanalysis, mining
analysis for its phenomenological capabilities would ensure the
integrity of the psychodynamic identity in a domain increasingly
tinged with neuro-reductionism. Such an approach would allow
neuropsychoanalysis to ﬂourish because of, rather than despite,
the different perspectives of its comprising disciplines.
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